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EMINENT DOMAIN - TAKING OR INJURY OF PROPERTY
AS GROUNDS FOR COMPENSATION - NAVIGATIONAL
SERVITUDE

United States v.Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967);
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
It might be assumed that every substantial taking of a private
property interest for a public use must be compensated pursuant
to a constitutional provision. If this assumption were limited to
those interests taken by exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, it would be correct.' No compensation is the rule, however, when the federal and some State governments take or impair
certain private property interests in the exercise of their navigation
powers.'
The federal privilege of no compensation, which has alternately
been termed a "superior navigational easement,"' a "dominant servitude,"4 or an "easement of navigation,"5 is often rationalized on
the theory that when the federal government exercises its navigation power and a property interest burdened by the dominant servitude is taken, there is no damage within the meaning of the fifth
amendment because the taking is a result of the lawful exercise of
a power to which the interest has always been subject.' The privilege may be invoked only when the power is exercised upon a navigable body of water7 and for a purpose beneficial to navigation.'
1See 1 C.

NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 (rev. 3d. ed. 1964).
The federal government derives its power to control and protect the country's
navigable waters from the commerce clause of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The States' navigation power is based upon ownership of
the land beneath their territorial waters. See generally Stone, Public Rights in Water
Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 36.4(A) (Clark ed. 1967).
3
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
4Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954);
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
5United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
6 E.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
7This limitation does not greatly restrict the scope of the privilege. Navigable
bodies of water have been held to include not only those which are navigable in fact,
but also those which may become navigable after improvements are made. United
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Waterways once navigable remain so regardless of their actual condition. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
8Again, the limitation is not stringent; the benefit to navigation need not be the
2
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Furthermore, only a limited class of property interests may be taken
without compensation. The courts originally held that only those
interests in land below the high-water mark of a navigable body
of water were 'burdened 'by the dominant servitude; hence, if fast
lands - those above the high-water mark - were taken, the owner
would have to be compensated.' This federal power has been
extended, however, to make any value in riparian land arising from
the land's proximity to a navigable 'body of water subject to its
exercise.'" United States v.Rands" is a recent case which turned
on the broadened federal dominant servitude.
Respondent Rands owned land along the Columbia River in
Oregon. The land was leased, with an option to purchase, to the
State which contemplated the creation of an industrial park which
would possess its own port facilities. The option was never exercised because the land was condemned by the United States for use
in a river development project."
In determining that the port site value of Rands' land was not
compensable, the Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit,
found the case of United States v. Twin City Power Co. 3 to
be controlling. In Twin City, the United States condemned land
upon which the power company had intended to construct a powerplant. The Court held that the government was not obligated to
compensate the landowner for the element of value arising from
the land's potential as a powerplant site because this element was
"a value in the flow of the stream,"'4 thus subservient to the federal
exclusive or even the major purpose of the project. See United States v. Grand River
Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960). A congressional declaration of navigational
purpose is virtually conclusive of the applicability of the federal privilege under the
commerce clause. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
9 See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURm.l REsouRcEs J. 1, 39 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Morreale].
10
See id. at 41; United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 595

(1941).
11389 U.S. 121 (1967).
12
Rands' land was conveyed to Oregon pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 578 (1964). At
the subsequent condemnation proceeding the district court overruled Rands' motion to
amend his pleading in order to challenge the right of the United States to condemn
property. The district court held that the land's use was not compensable as a port
site. United States v. Rands, 224 F. Supp 305 (D. Ore. 1963). The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Rands should have been given an opportunity to raise the defense under FED. I? CiV. P. 71A, and that the Government was
required under the fifth amendment to compensate Rands for the fair market value of
the land as a port site. Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1966).
13 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
1-Id. at 225.
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navigational servitude. The Court in Rands reasoned that port
site value also derived from the accessibility of riparian land to
navigable waters and for the same reason must also be noncompensable. 5
This conclusion appears correct. Access to a body of water is
the cardinal element of powersite value and should therefore go
uncompensated when it stands alone as well as in combination with
other noncompensable values. Furthermore, had the United States
destroyed respondent's access to the river by building a structure
in the water in front of his land,'6 or by changing the course of the
river,"7 respondent's loss would, in either case, have been uncompensated.
Perhaps more significant than the holding in Rands was the
overruling by the Court of United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co. 8 This decision stood for the dual proposition that
while the value of riparian land attributable to an operative powerplant is not compensable, the value derived from locks and canals
is. The rationale demanding this distinction was not articulated
by the Court and several writers have attempted to fill this void.
The best of these explanations concluded that the holding was "untenable."' 9 The Twin City Court suggested that the dual holding
in Chandler-Dunbarwas based on the fact that the locks and canals
were in aid of navigation." Despite this explanation, several commentators suggested that Twin City overruled Chandler-Dunbar
sub silentio.2 ' This observation has been borne out. In the principal decision, the Court said in reference to the lock and canal
awards: "That aspect of the decision has been confined to its special facts, and, in any event, if it is to any extent inconsistent with
Twin City, it is only the latter which survives."2 2 In the future it
is highly unlikely that the Court will make nice distinctions between various values in riparian land that, in fact, derive their value
23
from the flow of a stream.
15 389 U.S. at 124-25.
16 See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
17 See South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
1'229 U.S. 53 (1913).
19 See Morreale at 48-49, 52.
20 350 U.S. at 226-27.
21 See Morreale at 52-53 & n.297.
22 389 U.S. at 126-27.
23 The propriety of compensating Rands for the agricultural value of his land was
not questioned. If such land were dependent on water from the river for irrigational
purposes, presumably its agricultural value would also be noncompensable.
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Subsidiary to the federal navigation power is the States' power
to control the navigable waters within their territorial limits.2" Several State courts have reasoned that an exercise of the State navigation power may also be accompanied by a privilege of no compensation.2" In limiting the operation of this servitude to certain
riparian interests, and permitting the privilege to be exercised only
in aid of navigation, these courts have adopted limitations akin to
those placed on the federal servitude.2 6 The Supreme Court of
California, in Colberg, Inc. v. State,2 ' permitted the State to invoke
its privilege of no compensation in conjunction with a project which
did not benefit navigation.
Petitioner Colberg, Inc., for more than 60 years had operated
a shipyard riparian to the Upper Stockton Ship Channel - a waterway having only one access by water to the Pacific Ocean. The
State proposed to construct a pair of freeway bridges across the
channel at a point between petitioner's facilities and this sole access. The proposed bridges were to have a clearance of 45 feet.
Eighty-one percent of petitioner's business involved ships with superstructures in excess of 45 feet from the waterline. Anticipating
the destruction of his business, petitioner sought a declaratory judgment to ascertain, prior to construction of the bridges, whether he
would have a cause of action for damages under the law of eminent
domain.
In an unreported opinion, the trial court held that the construction of the bridge was an exercise of the State's rightful control
over the use of its territorial waters and would not be compensable
as a taking or damaging under the California constitution.2" The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the proposed bridge project
24

See note 2 supra See also Sato, Water Resources - Comments Upon the
Federal-StateRelationship,48 CAmIF. L. REv. 43 (1960).
25
E.g., Beidler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 III. 628, 71 N.E. 1118 (1904); Natcher v.
City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936); Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961); State ex rel. A.ndersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
26
See 26 AM. JrJR 2D Eminent Domain § 191 (1966); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1156
(1934). Though the no-compensation rule is inapplicable because a project is not in
aid of navigation, damage to a private owner may still not be compensable. See State
ex rel. Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St 2d 11, 203 N.F2d 325 (1964), where the
relator's loss was not sufficient to constitute a "taking" within the meaning of OIo
CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
27432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
28

See Colberg, Inc. v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1967). The eminent
domain provision of the California Constitution states: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation ...
CAL. CONSr. art. I,

§ 14.
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was not an exercise of the State's navigational power and that in an
appropriate condemnation proceeding, plaintiff could be awarded
compensation upon demonstrating compensable damage.29
The California Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting,
stated that "the State's power to regulate and control its navigable
waters is not limited to purposes of navigation, and the servitude
in its favor is of a commensurate scope."3
The implications of
the holding are significant. By removing one of the three usual
limitations placed on the operation of the doctrine of dominant
servitude - that the servitude may be exercised only in aid of navigation - the court suggested that the privilege of no compensation
is available for any project benefiting commerce which takes or
damages any of those interests customarily subject to the dominant
servitude.
The line of reasoning followed by the court may be illustrated
as follows: (A) The State's power to regulate its navigable waters
is broader than the federal government's paramount regulatory
powers in these waters; (B) the privilege of no compensation may
accompany the exercise of the federal government's paramount
powers; and therefore (C), the privilege of no compensation which
may accompany the exercise of a State's power is broader than the
federal government's privilege.
The court's major premise is sound. The power of a State to
perform acts consistent with the trust under which it owns its navigable waterways is considered absolute until Congress acts on the
same subject. 1 The minor premise is also correct and constituted
the broad principle upon which the Rands case was decided. The
validity of the court's conclusion is questionable since true syllogistic
logic was not employed. Though numerous courts have held that
their respective jurisdictions have the benefit of a dominant servitude,3" none have given this servitude the scope that the California
servitude was held to possess.
The court initially sought to support its conclusion by a group
of cases which purportedly held "that the state's servitude operates
upon certain private rights . . . whenever the state deals with its
navigable waters in a manner consistent with the public trust under
which they are held."33 However, none of these decisions involved
29 Colberg, Inc. v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 159, 167 (Ct. App. 1967).
30 432 P.2d at 14 n.17, 62 Cal. Rptt. at 412 n.17.
31 See 56 AM. JUR. Waters S 204 (1947); Sato, supra note 24.
32 See cases cited note 25 supra.

33 432 P.2d at 11-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
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an application of the doctrine of navigable servitude. Instead, four
of the decisions are representative of cases restricting the power of
the State, or an individual, to alienate the bed of a navigable body
of water by holding that such a conveyance is subject to the power
of the State to utilize this area for a public purpose.3" A fifth
dealt with a similar principle applicable to tidelands - riparian
land which is submerged at high tide. 5 The remaining two cases
contain dicta suggesting the doctrine of navigational servitude is
available for the general purpose of promoting commerce, but neither case was actually decided on that basis.3 "
It is arguable that some of these precedents require the loss of
Colberg to go uncompensated. None provide support, however,
for achieving this end by casting out the "navigational purpose"
limitation. The elimination of this limitation was based primarily
upon policy."7
The majority viewed the "navigational purpose" limitation as
34

E.g., Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 112 Conn. 199, 152 A. 210 (1930); Darling
v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918), aff'd, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).
Both cited cases held that an individual who leases underwater land from a municipality
for the purpose of propagating oysters will not be compensated if the same municipality
frustrates the lessee's purpose by dumping sewage into the waters. For a discussion of
the "oyster" cases see 1 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 160 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL] and Annot, 3 A.L.R. 762 (1919).
In Crary v. State Highway Comm'n, 219 Miss. 284, 68 So. 2d 468 (1953) plaintiff
possessed the statutory privilege of growing oysters and erecting a bathhouse on the
river bottom adjacent to her riparian land. Though this privilege became worthless
because of the construction of a bridge, the court denied plaintiff compensation for an
alleged taking because it viewed the bridge as an additional public use upon property
already set aside for a public purpose. Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d
342 (1942) involved a nonriparian owner who possessed the right to utilize the water
of a public lake for activities such as boating and bathing. The court held that his
rights were not inviolate in the face of regulatory ordinances passed by a municipality
for the benefit of the public welfare. A general discussion of these "public purpose"
decisions will be found in 1 POWELL § 160; Stone, supra note 2, at 196-98; 32 MItNN,
L. REv. 484, 491-92 (1948).
35
In City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d 438 (1940),
appellant's access to navigable water was cat off when the municipality reclaimed and
filled tideland. In an action to quiet title the court held that any right of access over
publicly owned tidelands may be terminated whenever the public purpose so requires.
For a discussion of tideland decisions, see 1 POWELL § 163, at 657-60.
3
6 See Milwaukee-Western Fuel Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 152 Wis. 247, 139 N.W.
540 (1913) and Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Maine 76, 51 A. 806 (1901)
where both courts reasoned that federal approval of a bridge was conclusive on the
question of whether the bridge harmed navigation and that if it did not harm navigation it could not be considered a nuisance. The Frost case further reasoned that although a party's access to his wharf was destroyed by the construction of a federally
approved structure, he suffered no compensable loss because his loss was the same as
that of any other "persons who might have occasion, however seldom, to navigate the
channel." Id. at 86, 51 A. at 809. The conclusion is highly questionable.
37
See 432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
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having originated in an era when the bulk of the demands placed
on navigable waters by commerce was for surface transportation.
The diversified, burgeoning demands of modern commerce upon
navigable waters, particularly in densely populated areas, impelled
the court to expand the doctrine beyond its traditional limits.
What considerations will a court in another jurisdiction have
to make prior to adopting the holding in Colberg? First, it will
have to overcome the repugnance of shifting the cost of a project
which benefits commerce from public or commercial interests to a
single or small handful of private citizens. 8 This future court will
next have to be convinced that the increased demands of commerce
upon navigable waters in populous areas militate for this shift, and
not for cost distribution through taxation, tolls, license plate fees,
or similar means.39 Finally, it must be satisfied that a rationale
which permits the State to build a bridge that destroys the business
of a shipyard without compensation to the owner is not anomalous
in light of the fact that had the bridge approach ramps been placed
on the same property, the law of eminent domain would have required compensation.4"
A judge might choose to go even further in his analysis and
consider the soundness of the doctrine of navigational servitude
when kept within its traditional limitations. Although the doctrine has often been applied by the Supreme Court in decisions such
as Rands, and has been expanded by a respected State supreme
court in Colberg, it has also been criticized. 4 Although there is
some historical justification for the no-compensation privilege,4 2 the
courts have never articulated convincing reasons for its continued
application.43 The rationale most often presented to justify the
privilege is not well founded because in a sense all private property
38 The court might also consider the caveat of Professor Nichols:

The practice of denying compensation for the taking of property for the
public use on the ground that it is merely the exercise of a public right is
capable of such unlimited possibilities of abuse as to be a dangerous one, and
should not be extended in the absence of an unquestioned historical foundation for the public right claimed. 2 C. NICHOLS, supra note 1, § 5.795 [2],
at 295-96.
39 See 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (dissenting opinion).
40 The dissent in Colberg also pointed out that the law of eminent domain in California would require that Colberg be compensated if its access to the highway were cut
off by a public works project. This is another anomaly. See id. at 17-19, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 415-17.
41See Morreale at 19-31; Sato, supra note 24, at 47, 57. See also 55 MICH. L
REV. 272,275 (1956); 13 MONT. L. REV. 102, 108 (1952).
42
Morreale at 25-31.
43
See id. at 21-22.

